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'  ~  ... ,.!  The  programm  of  this  Symposium  says~ 
that  I would  deliver  the  closing  address  on  Saturday~  15th. 
Unfortunately  I will  not  be  able  to  do  so. 
The  reason  Is  that  I have  to  participate the  same  day  in  a 
meeting  of  trade  ministers  of  industrialized  and  developping 
countries  in  Rio  de  Janeiro. 
I got  the  invitation  for  this meeting  only  a fortnight 
ago  when  the  programme  of  the  Symposium  had  already  been 
distributed. 
I want  to  take  this opportunitY 
.. 
to  make  a  few  personal  remarks  relating  to  my  work  and  experience 
with  US-relations  in  my  capacity  as  EC-Commissioner  in  charge 
of  External  Relations~ 
a  job  that  I have  had  for  almost  eight  years. 
Let  me  say~  at the  outset~ 
that  any  EC-External-Relations-Commissioner  cannot  help 
becoming  deeply  involved  in  us  affairs. 
However  hard  he  may  try  to  concentrate  on  other  parts of  the  world 
or  other  issues~ 
he  simply  cannot  ignore  what  is  going  on  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic  and  between  the  two  shores. 
This  may  appear  to  be  a truism. 
It  is  nevertheless  a fundamental  expression  of  the  nature 
and  the  priorities of  Community's  external  relations. 
The  nature  of  EC  external  relations~ as  they  stand~  is  essentially 
economic. 
It  is  with  economics  and  trade  that  we  deal, 
even  when  we  pursue  overall  foreign  policy  objectives. 
We  do  not  deal  in  what  may  be  called  pure  politics~ 
and  we  do  not  at  all deal  in  security matters. This  may  partially explain  the  fact 
that  we  have  practically  no  business  with  the  super-power 
on  our  Eastern  front,  the  Soviet  Union. 
In  my  eight  years  of  service 
:.•' 
I have  certainly met  more  than  20  different  US  Cabinet  officers 
both  under  democratic  and  republican  administration; 
but  during  the  same  time  I have  met  no  Soviet  Minister. 
What  is  true  at ministerial  level  applies,  of  course,  also  to 
contacts  at official  level: 
Community  and  us  administration officials deal  with  each  other 
almost  dailY  and  as  a matter  of  routine. 
Issues  vary  from  Central  America  to  agricultural  exports, 
energy  research, 
banking  legislation, 
taxation 
and  Polish  debt. 
With  the  Soviet  admlnistratron,  however 
<with  whom  we  do  not  have  any  diplomatic  relations), 
contacts  are  extremely  rare  and  may  cdme  up  only  dn  occasion 
of  some  anti-dumping-proceedings. 
I draw  this comparison  in  order  to  underline  the  self-evident. 
We  have  become  so  closely  interwoven  with  the  US  economy 
and  society 
that  we  simply  cannot  distract ourselves  from  it. 
Our  "East-West-relationshiPs"  are  therefore  profoundly  assymmetrical. 
We  may  regret  this, 
but  I do  not  see  prospects  for  a more  symmetrical  relationshiP 
ahead  of  us, 
at  least  not  in  the  near  future. 
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, Public  opinion  ...  :.  -
probably  more  on  our  than  on  the  US  stde, 
tends  to  perceive  US-Ee-relations  as  fraughtWith  tension  and  conflict. 
Sometimes  the  political  observer  may  get  the  impression 
that our  relationshiP  is  basically  marked  by  disharmony. 
He  is  impressed  by  recurrent  discussions  about 
trade  wars ... 
protectionism, 
violation 1f sovereignty 
or  the  dama01ng  effects of  US  economic  policy  on 
European  prosperity, 
This  perception,  however ...  does  not  correctly  reflect  realitY 
(Just  as  the  media  reflect also  a rather  distorted  image 
of  the  European  Community), 
We  tend  to  overstate  any  departure  from  normal. 
We  do  not,  for  very  good  reasons,  regfster  the  smooth  day-to-day 
operations  of  some  economic  or  social  process: 
smooth-running  means  no  news. 
We  rather  tend  to  focus 
-,with  a powerful  laser-beam-
public  attention  on  minor  items 
which  give  rise to  divergencies  of  view, 
and  we  thus  lose  sight  of  the  overall  perspective. 
Let  me  illustrate this  by  a very  simple  example: 
In  1984  our  bilateral  trade  with  the  US  is  likely  to  exceed 
100  billion dollar 
<three  times  more  important  than  our  trade 
with  either the  Soviet  Union  or  Japan). This  trade  is  being  carried  on  basically  free  of  obstacles; 
there  are  only  very  low  duties; 
on  a substantial  part  of  trade  there  are  none  at all; 
there  are  no  quantitative  restrictions. 
We  have  no  specific bilateral  trade  agreement; 
we  simply  apply  the  general  rules  of  the  GATT. 
And  still  many  people  have  the  impression 
that  US-EC-trade  is  a mine-field  of  protectionism 
and  not  at all  as  free  as  it &hould  be. 
However~ 
if you  look  at  the  amount  of  trade 
that  <during  the  last eight  years)  was  really  hurt 
by  protectionist  measures  on  either side, 
the  percentage  will  not  exceed  one  or  two  percent 
of  tot  a  1 tra.de. 
Indeed,  I  must  search  hard  1n  my  memory  to  recall  striking examples 
when  trade  has  been  affected. 
This  may  appear  implausible  to  many  among  you. 
Don•t  we  constantly  talk about  the  danger  of  US  protectionism, 
don't  we  talk  about  Community  threats  to  US  agricultural·expurts, 
don•t  we  address  reciProcal  warnings  to  each  other? 
All  this  is  true  and  it also  explains  what  may  seem  to  be  a parad<?X· 
Indeed, 
with  so-much  trade  and  so  much  economic  involvement  it ~ould 
be  miraculous 
if there  were  not  constantly  frictions  or  threats 
of  cor:flict. 
' , ' 
j But  - and  this  is  an  essential  but  -
our  relationshiP  ts  such  that  mostlY  we  manage  to  avert 
frictions  from  becoming  open  conflicts. 
We  know  about  the  sensitivitY of  issues  on  the  other  side; 
we  tell each  other  in  advance  that  some  measures  may  be 
bound  to  provoke  counter-measures; 
we  rattle a  lot  and  in  doing  so 
we  avoid  taking  action  that  would  be  preJudicial 
to  the  other  side.  · 
The  fact  that  we  have  gone  through  the  deepest  recession 
without  resorting  to  any  significant extra  protection 
of  our  respective  markets 
must  be  seen- in  retrospect- as  maJor  political 
achievement  during  the  last  10  years: 
It  was  possible  only 
because  on  both  sides  those  in  charge  of  external  economic 
policy  had  some  recollection of  the  30%  shrinking  of  world 
trade  50  years  agoJ 
when  European  countries  and  the  United  States  resorted 
to  protectionism  and  "beggar  thy  nelghbour"-policy. 
It  was  also  possible 
because  we  managed  to  establish a personal  relationshiP 
both  at the  political  and  at  the  administrative  levelJ 
based  on  common  convictions  and  mutual  confidence. 
Our  common  conviction  was  the  belief 
in  the  merits  of  an  open  economic  system 
and  in  the  mutual  advantages  of  economic 
interdependence  between  Europe  and  the  us. In  the  trade  field  we  have  made  great  strides  in  that direction. 
We  have  managed 
to  deal  with  each  other  as  partners  with  equal  rights~ 
knowing  about  the  other's sensitivities 
and  trying  to  take  into  account  these  sensitivities  in  our 
political  processes. 
It  did  not  always  function  perfectlY~ 
but  even  when  accidents  occUred~ 
as  In  that  unfortunate  summer  of  1982  with  the  steel 
and  the  export  embargo  crises  combined~ 
we  managed  to  overcome  these  crises  and  quicklY  repair 
whatever  damage  may  have  occurred. 
In  the  economic  policy  field~ 
the  situation  has  been  so  far  less  satisfactory. 
Unlike  in  the  trade  field  there  is  a fundamental  asymmetry: 
Europe  is  much  more  dependent  on  US  economic  policy 
than  the  other  way  round. 
FundamentallY  because  there  is  no  single  European  economic  policy. 
The  lack  of  effective  Community  responsibility  ln  this  field 
partially explains  the  fact 
that  there  is  no  real  economic  policy  dialogue  going  on 
between  the  US  and  the  CommunitY. 
On  both  sides 
domestic  policy  considerations  determine  the  economic 
policy  priorities. 
Neither  side  takes  into  account  the  effects of  its policies 
on  the  outside. 
Within  the  CommunitY~ 
we  have  of  course  made  some  progress  towards  consulting 
each  other  on  the  objectives  of  our  respective  policies. 
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l,  Thus~  tn  the  CommunitY~ 
budget  deficits~ 
exchange  rates~ 
current  account  deficits 
are  no  longer  regarded  as  purely  domestic  affairs. 
We  recognize  a certain  Community  dimension. 
This  is  not  true  if we  look  beyond  the  Atlantic. 
This  may  be  tolerable  on  our  side~ 
because  of  the  limited  impact  of  our  national  economic  policy 
decisions. 
It  is  not  toler~ble for  the  dominant  wotld  economy 
whose  decisions  affect  the  whole  world  economy, 
not  only  marginally 
but  in  a substantial  way, 
I do  believe  therefore  -and I have  said  so  before  -
that  we  need  a substantive  transatlantic economic  policy  dialogue 
We  need  some  type  of  machinery~ 
as  we  have  created  it within  the  EC~ 
which  allows  for  regular  reviewing  of  the  main  issues 
in  monetary~  budgetary  incomes  and  exchange  policy. 
The  faster  we  will  progress  with  intra-European  economic  policy 
cooperation~ 
the  easier  it will  be 
to  impress  upon  the  US  side  the  need  for  such  a dialogue 
and  to  prove  our  credibility~ -
Let  me  ~  in  conclusion~  make  a more  general  point  on  the  European-
American  relationship. 
In  recent  years  there  has  been  a rather  general  tendency  in  Europe 
- in  some  countries  more  than  in  others  -
to  attribute European  troubles  to  American  policies. 
Whatever  policy  the  US  followed  in  the  economic  field~ 
it did  not  live  up  to  European  expectations: 
.  ... 
Either  the  dollar  was  too  cheap  or  too  expensive.  t 
The  high  US  interest  rate  has  been  made  responsible 
for  our  weak  propensity  to  invest  and~  following~ 
for  our  low  growth  rates etc. 
I think  we  must  stop  looking  across  the  Atlantic  for  scapegoats. 
We  must  not  continously  bemoan  our  economic  destiny 
and  live  under  the  -false - impression 
as  if our  destiny  were  determined  in  New  York 
or  in  Washington  D.C. 
It is  definitely  not! 
Indeed~  if we  look  at the  European  Picture~  we  find 
that  some  countries  have  been  doing  much  better  than  others~ 
despite  the  high  US  interest  rate or  the  high  dollar. 
We  can  and  we  should  do  much  better  in  Europe~ 
provided 
~---------
- we  wasted  less  of  our  resources  in  intra-European  ouarrels 
and  by  duplication  of  efforts; 
-we  really  pushed  ahead  towards  one  big  single  industrial 
market  with  no  artificial barriers 
·  through  customs  procedures; 
·  different  national  standards~ 
restrictive government  procurement  policies 
·  and  the  inhibiting  effects of  10  national  currencies; .. 
' 
-we demonstrated  determination  and  willingness 
·  to  cope  with  the  changing  world  environment 
·  and  to  face  our  future  with  courage  instedad 
of  pessimism. 
Some  months  ago  Lawrence  Eagleburger~  the  US  Under-secretary  of  State. 
made  some  critical  remarks  about  the  growing  perception  in  the  US 
of  a Europe 
- that  is  not  living  up  to  American  hopes~ 
- is  lacking  dynamism 
-and fails  to  play  the  role  it should  in  world  affairs. 
And  he  summoned  the  vision  of  a dawning  Pacific  region~ 
full  of  dynamism  and  vitalitY~ 
contrasted  wtth  an  ecliPsing  Europe~ 
marked  by  despondency  and  pessimism. 
I think  we  should  take  Eagleburger's  warning  serious. 
Indeed~ 
1t  is  with  us~ 
with  our  parochialism  and  our  lacking  vitalitY~ 
that  I see  the  greatest dangers  for  the  future  of  transatlantic 
relations. 
Unless  there  is  more  determination  on  the  European  side 
to  tackle  our  own  economic  and  political  problems 
- including  securitY  -
we  run  the  risk  of  being  sooner  or  later relegated 
to  secondary  rank. 
Let  me  therefore  conclude  with  the  hope 
that~ 
when  the  College  of  Europe  10  years  from  now~  will 
organize  another  workshop  on  European-American  relations 
such  gloomy  speculation  will  have  proved  unJustified. Instead.,  I definitely hope 
that  by  1994  we  shall  have  made  further  progress 
towards  establishing a truly cooperative  transatlantic 
partnership 
between  a more  united  and  stronger  Europe  on  one  side 
and  a powerful  US  on  the  other  side. 
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